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Following the August 1968 Soviet-led invasion of Czech-
oslovakia, 11,200 Prague Spring refugees were resettled 
in Canada. This movement included many experienced 
professionals and skilled tradespeople. This article exam-
ines how these refugees navigated language training and 
barriers to employment, including professional accredita-
tion, and examines how this experience shaped bureau-
cratic and public views of refugee integration. The focus 
of this article is primarily on resettlement and integration 
efforts in Ontario, since roughly half of the Prague Spring 
refugees were permanently resettled in the province. The 
article outlines how, as part of its efforts to help the refu-
gees with their economic and social integration, Canadian 
officials provided assisted passage, initial accommodations, 
help with securing Canadian employment, and English- or 
French-language training. Prague Spring refugees navigat-
ed professional obstacles, including securing accreditation 
of their foreign credentials and underemployment in their 
respective fields. Their successful resettlement and integra-
tion depended on intergovernmental cooperation between 
Canada and its provinces, and the assistance provided by 
local Czech and Slovak communities across the country.
Résumé
Suite à l’invasion menée par l’Union soviétique en Tché-
coslovaquie en août 1968, 11 200 réfugiés du Printemps 
de Prague ont été relocalisés au Canada. Ce mouvement 
comprenait plusieurs professionnels expérimentés et ou-
vriers qualifiés. Cet article examine comment ces réfugiés 
ont composé avec la formation linguistique et les obstacles 
à l’emploi, y compris l’accréditation professionnelle, et 
examine comment cette expérience a façonné la vision 
bureaucratique et publique de l’intégration des réfugiés. 
Cet article se concentre principalement sur les efforts de 
réinstallation et d’intégration en Ontario, étant donné 
qu’environ la moitié des réfugiés du Printemps de Prague 
ont été réinstallés de façon permanente dans la province. 
Cet article décrit comment, dans le cadre de leurs efforts 
pour favoriser l’intégration économique et sociale des réfu-
giés, les autorités canadiennes leur ont fourni une aide au 
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transport, un hébergement initial, de l’aide pour obtenir un 
emploi au Canada et une formation linguistique en anglais 
ou en français. Les réfugiés du Printemps de Prague ont été 
confrontés à des obstacles professionnels, notamment en 
ce qui concerne l’accréditation de leurs diplômes étrangers 
et le sous-emploi dans leurs domaines respectifs. Le succès 
de leur relocalisation et de leur intégration reposait sur la 
coopération intergouvernementale entre le Canada et ses 
provinces et sur le soutien apporté par les communautés 
tchèques et slovaques locales à travers le pays.
Introduction
Overnight on August 20–21, 1968, Warsaw Pact forc-es invaded Czechoslovakia to crush the Prague Spring—a period that lasted over seven months in 
which civic freedoms were restored, press censorship was 
abolished, and the economy was liberalized, all in an effort 
to reform the communist regime from within. The sudden 
crisis forced approximately 27,000 Czechoslovak nationals 
to seek refuge in the West. They joined close to 80,000 com-
patriots who were in Austria, Yugoslavia, West Germany, 
Italy, France, and the United Kingdom at the time of the So-
viet-led invasion. Many of these individuals were on holiday, 
studying at universities abroad, or conducting business as 
representatives of state companies. As a result of the inva-
sion, many individuals and families decided that they could 
not return home and looked for permanent resettlement in 
the West. Conversely, Czechoslovak nationals who left their 
homeland after the invasion did so because they refused to 
live under Soviet occupation. Many of them sought United 
Nations (UN) convention refugee status and asylum in the 
West (Holborn, 1975, pp. 516–517).
Many Czechoslovak nationals did not meet the con-
ditions for UN convention refugee status since they were 
outside of their home country at the time of the invasion. 
While the office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) declined to label them as convention 
refugees, the Canadian government chose to manipulate the 
convention definition and later deemed them as refugees. 
Manpower and Immigration officials viewed the Czechoslo-
vak refugees (also commonly referred to as the Prague Spring 
refugees) as “good material” as a result of their post-second-
ary education, training, work experience, professions and 
skilled trades, and linguistic abilities (Madokoro, 2009, 
pp. 165–167). Canadian officials also believed that this “small 
gold mine of talent” would be able to rapidly assimilate into 
the fabric of Canadian society and make a significant con-
tribution to Canada’s economy (Whalen, 1968).
Several reasons underpin the Canadian government’s 
decision to resettle approximately 11,200 Prague Spring 
refugees between September 1968 and January 1969 (Can-
ada, 1970, p. 524). Scholarship has claimed that political 
self-interest, economic considerations, and international 
humanitarianism played an important role in the federal 
government’s decision to bring mostly young and well-edu-
cated skilled workers and professionals to Canada because 
they could make an immediate contribution to Canadian 
society and its economy (Troper, 1993, p. 271). Scholars 
have also pointed to Cold War ideological considerations 
to explain Canada’s resettlement of these refugees. Cana-
dian officials relaxed immigration criteria, including med-
ical examination and security screening, to embarrass the 
Soviet authorities for propaganda purposes and to politicize 
the Eastern Bloc as a group of refugee-producing commu-
nist states (Dirks, 1977, p. 255). 
Humanitarian organizations and supporters of refugee 
rights criticized the Canadian government for playing Cold 
War politics in its selection and admission of refugees flee-
ing communism in Eastern Europe, while other individuals 
in search of refuge from right-wing regimes were ignored 
(Troper, 1993, p. 272). Others suggest that federal officials 
used the pretence of humanitarian intervention to disguise 
economic self-interest and bring refugees to Canada who 
did not pose a security risk to Canadian society. In addition, 
the Canadian government sought to maintain good rela-
tions with its Soviet counterparts and to promote détente 
without further heightening Cold War tensions (Madokoro, 
2009, p. 168). 
The Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia caught 
Canadian officials by surprise. Initially hesitant to imple-
ment a military or humanitarian response, the Canadian 
government was criticized by the mainstream press for its 
perceived inaction. Coupled with the lobbying efforts of 
the Canadian Czechoslovak and nationalist Slovak com-
munities, Canadian officials were pressured to establish a 
resettlement scheme for the Prague Spring refugees. In the 
context of the Cold War, Canadian officials were aware that 
many of these individuals and families held pro-democracy 
and anti-communist values that fit into the conservative 
Cold War consensus found in Canada. Similarly, Canadian 
officials deemed the Prague Spring refugees to be highly 
desirable immigrants—as a result of their political beliefs 
and economic backgrounds as skilled workers and profes-
sionals—who could adapt rapidly to Canada’s culture and 
economy (Raska, 2018, pp. 146–147).
The Prague Spring refugee movement occurred during 
a period of immigration policy formulation that sought to 
address labour shortages in Canada’s economy. Coupled 
with the liberalization of Canadian immigration with the 
introduction of Order-in-Council P.C. 1967–1616—com-
monly referred to as the points system, in which racial and 
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geographic criteria limiting immigration were removed—
immigrant selection was based increasingly on education, 
skills, work experience, and the linguistic ability of the 
prospective immigrant. Meanwhile, bureaucratic efforts 
to integrate newcomers were organized into a framework 
beginning with immigrant selection, followed by short-
term integration—helping immigrants access services, 
including language training, orientation, and employ-
ment—and completed with these individuals obtaining 
citizenship (Griffith, 2017, pp. 5–6). Nearly a decade before 
the special program for Prague Spring refugees, the Cana-
dian government articulated in its 1959 Canada Year Book 
that Canadian integration recognized and respected the 
cultural contributions of immigrants from diverse ethnic 
backgrounds because these newcomers cared for the wel-
fare of their new country. Federal officials further suggested 
that ultimate responsibility for integration rested with the 
Canadian public, because without their support and accept-
ance of immigrants into their communities, no integration 
could occur. However, immigrant integration remained 
a voluntary process between the state and the newcomers 
themselves (Canada, 1959, p. 177).
Canadian officials could turn to a historical precedent to 
inform their decisions on the admission and resettlement 
of Prague Spring refugees in Canada. In November 1956, 
Soviet forces crushed the Hungarian Revolution and forced 
over 200,000 Hungarians to seek safe haven in Austria 
and Yugoslavia. The events in Hungary drew widespread 
attention from the Canadian public (Kelley & Trebilcock, 
2010, pp. 345–347). As mainstream press outlets referred to 
the Hungarian refugees as “freedom fighters,” the Cana-
dian government saw an opportunity to embarrass the 
Soviet Union by resettling them in Canada (Dirks, 1977, 
p. 255). Federal officials willingly received individuals who 
espoused a pro-democracy and anti-communist identity, 
but also viewed the refugees—in economic terms—as an 
excellent source of skilled labour due to their post-second-
ary education, previous work experience, and established 
professions in medicine, law, academia, and the arts. The 
Canadian government responded by relaxing immigration 
admissions criteria to bring approximately 37,500 Hungar-
ian refugees to Canada. Along with provincial authorities, 
voluntary service agencies, and the Canadian Hungarian 
community, the 1956 Hungarian refugee movement rep-
resents the first instance of public-private collaboration in 
refugee resettlement during the postwar period (Hawkins, 
1988, pp. 115–116). 
Twelve years later, the Soviet-led invasion of Czecho-
slovakia once again garnered widespread public attention 
and forced Canadian officials to respond to the plight of 
the Prague Spring refugees. The Canadian government 
recognized that Czechs and Slovaks had fled communism 
in their homeland, which helped to establish their Cold 
War desirability within Canadian society. Federal officials 
believed these refugees would promote the Cold War con-
sensus and help prevent communist infiltration in their eth-
nocultural communities and across Canada (Raska, 2018, 
pp. 225, 230–231). 
Ethnocultural communities play an important part in 
the social integration of recently arrived refugees in Can-
ada. The 1961 Canadian Census reported over 73,061 Czechs 
and Slovaks in Canada, with nearly half of them born 
overseas (Gellner & Smerek, 1968, pp. 82–83). Following the 
1948 communist takeover of Czechoslovakia, approximately 
4,000 anti-communist and pro-democracy refugees arrived 
in Canada (Raska, 2018, p. 86). These Czech and Slovak 
refugees were met by local members of the Czechoslovak 
and nationalist Slovak communities, many of whom were 
interwar immigrants and espoused a belief in a common 
“Czechoslovak” ethno-lingual heritage between Czechs and 
Slovaks or advocated for a separate Slovak national identity. 
The two ethnocultural communities were represented sep-
arately across Canada by the Czechoslovak National Asso-
ciation of Canada and the Canadian Slovak League. Both 
organizations were instrumental in assisting Cold War 
arrivals with access to federal and provincial services.
In the context of the Prague Spring movement, the social 
and economic integration of these refugees in Canada con-
sisted primarily of assisted passage, initial accommodations 
and funds for basic necessities, assistance in transitioning 
to Canadian employment, and English- or French-language 
training. Similar to the Assisted Passage Loan Scheme 
implemented in 1951, federal officials considered providing 
transportation loans to the Prague Spring refugees. In sub-
sequent Cabinet discussions, the refugees were placed in the 
same category as the 1956 Hungarian movement, which had 
received free transportation and resettlement support (Can-
ada, 1968, September 5). While newly arrived immigrants 
also had access to English- and French-language training 
across Canada, federal officials provided the Prague Spring 
refugees with allowances during their language courses 
(Raska, 2018, pp. 140, 155). The federal Cabinet later con-
cluded that the refugees had been invited to resettle in Can-
ada. Since they had not been treated as regular immigrants 
at the time of their admission, the Canadian government 
had “incurred a special responsibility” to look after them 
during their resettlement (Canada, 1968, October 3).
The Prague Spring refugee movement to Canada poses 
important questions: How did this movement of refugees 
from Czechoslovakia navigate language training and bar-
riers to employment, including accreditation? Did their 
experiences shape bureaucratic and public views of refugee 
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integration? This article focuses primarily on the resettle-
ment and integration efforts in Ontario, since roughly half 
of the approximately 11,200 Prague Spring refugees were 
permanently resettled in the province (Globe and Mail, 
1969). 
Language Training and Financial Assistance for 
Prague Spring Refugees
Approximately half of all individuals who arrived in Can-
ada through the special refugee program opted to resettle 
in Ontario because they had extended family, business con-
tacts, economic opportunities, and established Czech and 
Slovak populations. Given this reality, the provincial govern-
ment believed that the needs of the incoming refugees from 
Czechoslovakia could be adequately met through the estab-
lishment of a provincial action committee comprising repre-
sentatives from the Department of the Provincial Secretary 
and Citizenship, Department of Trade and Development 
(Immigration Branch), Department of Labour (Apprentice-
ship Branch), Department of Education (Arts and Techno-
logical Branch), and Department of University Affairs. The 
function of the provincial interdepartmental committee was 
to establish contact with community leaders and the refu-
gees themselves to determine their needs: to communicate 
to provincial and federal agencies and departments the spe-
cial needs of the refugees; to cooperate closely with the fed-
eral Department of Manpower and Immigration (DMI) in 
securing accommodation, employment, and counseling for 
refugees; to recommend to local and provincial authorities 
the necessary language and citizenship training that refugees 
required upon arrival; and to liaise with immigrant aid and 
social services agencies that worked closely with refugees 
from Czechoslovakia. In addition, provincial authorities at-
tempted to acquaint the Prague Spring refugees with proper 
business practices to assist them in succeeding in their pro-
fessions in Canada (Colombo, 1968).
In some cases, the level of assistance given to the refugees 
did not meet their specific needs and was insufficient in fur-
thering their socioeconomic integration in Canada. In early 
October 1968, Ontario’s minister of labour, Dalton Bales, 
received a letter from a constituent in his Greater Toronto 
riding of York Mills. The subject of the correspondence was 
the resettlement of three Prague Spring refugees who had 
arrived in Toronto three weeks earlier. The two young men 
and one woman were promised six months of schooling in 
English, with a small living allowance, by Canadian immi-
gration officials in Zurich, prior to leaving for Canada. The 
men were sent to the Cooksville area of Mississauga with 
no directions or money and were given cards informing the 
public that they were refugees from Czechoslovakia who 
could not speak English. One of the men was a welder by 
trade while the other was a university student. After report-
ing to a local Manpower office, they obtained employment 
as workers in a plastics factory for $1.75 per hour and moved 
to downtown Toronto, where they shared accommodations 
with Italian and Polish immigrants. Both refugees had yet 
to be paid and had already received a letter from the DMI 
informing them that $28 was due each month to pay for 
their assisted passage to Canada. Conversely, the young 
woman who was trained as a display artist and window 
dresser received $60 from the Manpower office for expenses 
as she attempted to secure employment after attending 
several unsuccessful job interviews. The letter to the min-
ister argued for more spaces in English-language classes 
so that these three refugees and their compatriots could 
acquire employment befitting their training and experience 
(Unknown [redacted], 1968).
The Ontario Department of the Provincial Secretary and 
Citizenship investigated the available language-training 
facilities in the province and concluded that programs for 
immigrant children were more than adequate, while Eng-
lish-language programs for adult newcomers were lacking. 
Provincial officials were surprised to learn that complaints 
recently brought forward by Czechoslovak community lead-
ers had confirmed a lack of adequate language-training facil-
ities for adults. Referrals to language-training programs for 
newcomers in the adult training centres had been reduced 
from 150 to 25 individuals per week, and then recently 
increased to 40 positions. The lack of adequate referrals was 
amplified by a waiting list of several hundred people. Addi-
tionally, the waiting period to begin such programs was 
over six months—excluding refugees from Czechoslovakia. 
Meanwhile, provincial officials were informed by their fed-
eral counterparts that the federal budget for English as a 
Second Language training under the Manpower Retraining 
Agreement was already overspent by three months. Given 
these circumstances, the Ontario government was aware 
that if settlement allowances were terminated for refugees 
without knowledge of English, these individuals would be 
forced to apply for welfare, as they had no previous work 
experience in Canada and could not qualify for unemploy-
ment insurance. Experts at the adult training centres noted 
that a majority of the recent arrivals from Czechoslovakia 
required 22 weeks of full-time language training to “func-
tion effectively in our society” (Yoerger, 1968, October 18). 
Consequently, many of the Prague Spring refugees were 
admitted into English classes sponsored under the Ontario 
Manpower Retraining Program (Welch, 1968, November 1).
Soon after, the Ontario government began to focus 
its efforts on providing financial assistance to the Prague 
Spring refugees. Provincial Secretary and Minister of Citi-
zenship Robert Welch informed his colleague, the minister 
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of social and family services, John Yaremko, that many of 
the refugees from Czechoslovakia had requested financial 
assistance while they attended full-time English-language 
training. Although financial assistance was available only 
to the unemployable, Welch noted that many ethnic groups 
across the province were concerned with the preferential 
treatment that the Prague Spring refugees were already 
receiving in their initial settlement in Canada. Welch agreed 
that these recent arrivals were receiving more assistance 
than previous groups of newcomers, as English-language 
training was being offered daily at adult training centres 
across the province, and several days per week through 
school boards. Similarly, free tuition was offered to refugees 
who wished to enrol in a university program, along with a 
full living allowance for up to six weeks after their arrival. 
Provincial officials were aware that very few refugees from 
Czechoslovakia had been unable to find work after arriving 
in Canada. However, Welch remained concerned that the 
precedent of reasonable assistance could not be maintained 
for future arrivals (Welch, 1968, November 19). Some of the 
refugees most in need of assistance were professionals who 
sought to continue their practices in Canada. 
Managing the Expectations of Refugee 
Professionals
Seizing upon newspaper coverage of the plight of five 
Prague Spring refugee dentists attempting to practise their 
profession in Canada, in early October 1968, Robert Nor-
man Thompson, Progressive Conservative MP for Red Deer 
and Opposition critic for employment and immigration, 
asked the minister of manpower and immigration, Allan 
MacEachen, whether the federal government was investigat-
ing their situation (Canada, 1969, p. 986). The dentists from 
Czechoslovakia were qualified to practise their profession in 
their homeland but were now being prevented from open-
ing a practice in Ontario for a period of 18 months in order 
to attend a mandatory retraining program. While dental 
school graduates with diplomas from American, Australian, 
British, and New Zealand institutions were permitted to take 
licensing tests in the province of their residence, graduates 
from all other countries were required to study two or more 
years at a Canadian dental school (Curry, 1968, October 15). 
MacEachen was aware of the situation, but noted that the 
issue of professional standards in dentistry was a question 
for the provincial governments and their respective provin-
cial associations. Thompson wondered whether the refugee 
dentists had been told of the situation in Canada prior to 
immigrating. MacEachen replied that Canadian immigra-
tion officials overseas attempted to inform every immigrant 
about the conditions they would find in Canada after reset-
tlement (Canada, 1969, p. 986). Following the media cover-
age of Question Period in the House of Commons, officials 
within the DMI requested that Canadian immigration offices 
overseas provide Ottawa with any available information on 
the counseling of refugee professionals and any advice given 
to dentists on any retraining they may have needed to com-
plete after arriving in Canada (Couillard, 1968).
Under normal immigration procedures, prospective 
immigrant professionals, including doctors, dentists, 
nurses, engineers, and architects, were required to submit 
their credentials to provincial professional licensing bodies 
before their immigration was approved. As a former Cana-
dian immigration officer who was posted to Vienna in 1968, 
Michael J. Molloy notes that in response to the sudden crisis 
in Czechoslovakia and the emergency nature of the Prague 
Spring movement, the Canadian government wanted to be 
sure that the refugees understood that they would not be 
able to work or would be underemployed in their professions 
upon arrival in Canada (personal communication, April 10, 
2019). In mid-October 1968, Canadian immigration officials 
in Vienna informed Ottawa that each refugee from Czecho-
slovakia was now receiving a standard 20-minute interview 
and was being counselled on what to expect after arriving in 
Canada. Immigration officials assessed applicants’ personal 
backgrounds and indicated any difficulties they might have 
upon arriving in Canada. Refugee professionals interested 
in resettling in Canada signed a statement of preparedness 
to undertake alternate employment. 
In the case of medical professionals, doctors were advised 
that they could expect to become medical laboratory tech-
nicians, while dentists were informed that they were likely 
to assume positions as dental technicians upon resettling 
in Canada. Doctors and dentists signed an additional 
statement:
I fully understand that my acceptance in the medical profession 
in Canada is at the sole discretion of the licencing authority in 
the province in which I wish to work or practise. I further under-
stand that acceptance by the licencing authority in any province 
or provinces in Canada is not an assurance of acceptance in oth-
er provinces. (Curry, 1968, October 16) 
Canadian officials in Vienna translated the above state-
ment into the Czech and Slovak languages to avoid any 
confusion on the part of the applicant. Canada’s European 
regional director of immigration in Geneva wrote to Ottawa, 
confirming that all refugee professionals from Czechoslo-
vakia were carefully informed of the difficulties they might 
encounter in Canada, including the fact that they might not 
be able to practise their profession or trade and had to be 
willing to accept alternative employment until they were able 
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to return to their industry through recertification (Curry, 
1968, October 16). 
Meanwhile, Canadian immigration authorities in Europe 
had received 8,207 enquires from Czechoslovak citizens for 
immigration to Canada, of which 6,344 (or 77.3%) resulted 
in applications. The largest number of applications was filed 
with Canadian immigration officials in Vienna. However, 
38% of all refugee applicants in Vienna did not attend their 
scheduled immigration interview and cancelled their flights, 
thus forcing the Canadian immigration team to find other 
successful applicants to keep each chartered aircraft full of 
refugees on their way to Canada (Curry, 1968, October 15). 
The DMI originally estimated that only 500 to 1,000 individ-
uals would apply for permanent resettlement from Austria 
and Yugoslavia during the special program. The demand of 
refugees fleeing Czechoslovakia soon outpaced Canadian 
officials’ expectations for the resettlement scheme. The fed-
eral government responded by allocating some of the special 
program’s $2 million fund to support the charter flights. In 
the first eight weeks after the Soviet-led invasion, 14 flights 
arrived in Canada, bringing refugees without a preference 
for settlement to every region of Canada. Soon thereafter, 
many of the Prague Spring refugees were enrolled in lan-
guage classes and special courses designed to teach them 
about Canadian customs and lifestyle, and had secured 
temporary and permanent employment. More than 1,900 of 
these individuals were receiving government assistance to 
support daily costs until they received their first pay cheque 
(Globe and Mail, 1968, October 24).
In addition to the linguistic difficulties that the new-
comers faced, many of them—including doctors, dentists, 
engineers, lawyers, accountants, and skilled tradespeo-
ple—were certified professionally in their chosen fields but 
faced challenges in having their credentials recognized in 
Canada. This issue was raised by community leaders in 
Toronto during their meetings with provincial officials in 
mid-October 1968. The Ontario government later recom-
mended to Ottawa that its language programs be expanded 
to include professionals rather than limit them to unskilled 
and semi-skilled refugees (Welch, 1968, October 30). Pro-
vincial officials noted that 300 locations in Toronto alone 
were open and ready to receive refugees for language train-
ing (Yoerger, 1968, October 21). 
Meanwhile, the five refugee dentists who sought to re-es-
tablish their practices in Ontario continued to ignite public 
debates about resettlement support and the recognition of 
foreign professional certifications. The Ontario Federation 
of Labour (OFL) lobbied the provincial government to assess 
each incoming dentist’s skills and knowledge with a practi-
cal examination under the auspices of the Royal College of 
Dental Surgeons instead of forcing them to enter a univer-
sity dentistry program for more schooling. The president of 
the OFL, David Archer, had sent Premier John Robarts a let-
ter criticizing the college’s insistence that refugee dentists 
undergo Canadian training in order to be fully licensed. 
Archer suggested that the college was involved in practices 
that discriminated against individuals by country of origin 
(Globe and Mail, 1968, October 21). Incidentally, officials in 
Ottawa could only locate the name of one of the dentists, 
Ján Vávra, who was residing in Hearst, Ontario (Head of 
Immigration Secretariat, 1968). According to Canadian 
immigration officials in Vienna, Vávra had signed a state-
ment confirming that he understood he would be expected 
to work as a dental technician before he could meet the pro-
fessional requirements in his province of residence. Vávra 
was offered employment as a dentist, but could not accept 
the position because he had yet to complete his Canadian 
training. The newly arrived refugee from Czechoslovakia 
claimed that he would need only one year to improve his 
English-language capabilities and become acquainted with 
the types of drugs, instruments and materials, and medical 
terms used in Canada. Like other newcomer dentists from 
Czechoslovakia, Vávra did not understand why he should 
be forced to attend university dentistry courses for two 
years.
The situation was much the same for doctors. A group of 
30 medical doctors was required to take special examina-
tions administered by the Ontario College of Physicians and 
Surgeons. For the refugee doctors whose English-language 
abilities were good and who were able to pass the examina-
tion, the college indicated that they would be permitted to 
undertake one- or two-year internships at hospitals across 
the province (Globe and Mail, 1968, October 2, p. 8). In St. 
Thomas, the Times-Journal published an article with an 
accompanying photograph describing the recent resettle-
ment of five refugee physicians to the area (see Figure 1).
In mid-November 1968, Ontario’s College of Dental Sur-
geons finally bowed to public pressure and agreed to allow 
the refugee dentists from Czechoslovakia to practise in the 
province if they passed a licensing examination. Six months 
later, sixteen refugee dentists failed the special licensing 
test, subsequently claiming that the result was due to not 
having been permitted to acquire sufficient practice in 
Canadian dental techniques after arriving. The group of 
dentists remained divided over their futures. Some of them 
agreed to take the exam again in November, while others 
considered moving elsewhere or enrolling in a two-year 
dentistry program at a Canadian university. While Cana-
dian dentistry graduates received their licences upon grad-
uation, licensing examinations were for the benefit of 
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incoming dentists from other countries (Lind, 1969). The 
college’s decision directly affected the five refugee dentists 
who were already living in Ontario, including Ján Vávra, 
and any others who had applied for a licence to practise in 
the province before 1969. Under the college’s newly relaxed 
licensing rules, the refugee dentists were placed in the same 
category as dentists from Commonwealth countries and 
Scandinavia and had their qualifications and experience 
accepted. As a result, they were only required to pass a 
licensing examination. The college encouraged the five den-
tists—three in Toronto and two in Windsor—along with Ján 
Vávra to increase their English-language proficiency and to 
shadow local dentists at their offices (Globe and Mail, 1968, 
November 13).
Throughout 1969, refugees from Czechoslovakia con-
tinued to arrive in Canada, but no longer under the special 
program. They were now subject to more stringent regula-
tions, particularly with regard to their professional status, 
as exemplified in the case of 17 doctors from Czechoslovakia 
who arrived in Canada from France, Germany, and Italy 
later that year. Unlike their professional colleagues who had 
arrived prior to the conclusion of the special program, the 
newly arrived doctors were required to complete a foreign 
medical graduate exam, while their compatriots who had 
arrived earlier were required only to complete a screening 
test before assuming hospital internships. Although the 
recently arrived doctors were specialists in their fields—
including anesthesia, epidemiology, gynecology, pathology, 
pediatrics, and surgery—their level of English comprehen-
sion was minimal. As a result, provincial authorities did not 
permit them to assume internships.
Toronto Life showcased the resettlement experience of an 
established surgeon with 23 years of professional experience 
(Hicks, 1969, p. 43). As one of approximately 100 doctors 
who were interviewed in Toronto by the College of Physi-
cians and Surgeons of Ontario, Anton Haninec passed an 
oral clinical knowledge examination and was permitted to 
apply only for a junior internship at a local hospital. The 
48-year-old experienced surgeon found an internship at the 
Lakeshore Psychiatric Hospital as a clinical clerk, a position 
that would normally have been filled by a fourth-year med-
ical student. Haninec had left Czechoslovakia aware that he 
had another two decades of work left in him, and he did not 
want to do it under communism. With the understanding 
that he could work another 20–25 years, Haninec recognized 
that in order to practise medicine again, he would have to 
Figure 1. Five Recently Settled Refugee Physicians
Ludmila Hilbert, Anthony Snopek, Olga Laczová, Peter Greščo, and Jiří Veselý—undergo a two-year internship at the local St. Thomas-Elgin 
General Hospital in southwestern Ontario. Courtesy of Elgin County Archives.
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seek Canadian certification by writing the Medical Council 
of Canada examinations (Hicks, 1969, p. 43). Like him, the 
majority of the doctors who were resettled in Canada with 
their families were in their 40s. Advocating on their behalf 
was Ruth Petříček, president of the Women’s Council of the 
Czechoslovak National Association of Canada (CNAC). She 
notified provincial officials in Ontario that these refugees 
were informed that Canada needed medical professionals 
and that they were encouraged to come to Canada. Petříček 
hoped that health officials in Ontario would afford the same 
privileges to the 17 medical professionals as they had to those 
doctors and dentists who had arrived a year earlier during 
the special program (Petříček, 1970).
Evaluating the Resettlement and Integration of 
Prague Spring Refugees
Following the termination of the special program for Prague 
Spring refugees, six Ontario-based Canadian Czechoslovak 
organizations—CNAC, Women’s Council of the CNAC, Ca-
nadian Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees, Masaryk Memo-
rial Institute, Permanent Conference of Slovak Democratic 
Exiles, and the Czechoslovak Branch No. 601 of the Royal 
Canadian Legion—distributed a report entitled Suggested 
Provincial Action and Programs Designed to Ease the Adjust-
ment Problems of Czechoslovak Refugees to the Department 
of the Provincial Secretary and Citizenship in Toronto (Co-
lombo, 1969). The report sought to raise awareness of the 
unique problems involved in the integration of the Prague 
Spring refugees in Ontario. It argued that the existing pro-
grams to which government agencies reverted were designed 
for “sponsored” or “open-placement” immigrants, and the 
recently arrived refugees could not “be easily fitted into the 
two above categories as they have had hardly any time to 
consider immigration to a new country. Their decision to 
leave their own country is a move to[ward] survival and not 
a plan to settle in another country” (Colombo, 1969). De-
spite this criticism, the six organizations commended federal 
and provincial officials for using their established networks 
of immigrant aid services to provide the refugees with a rela-
tively smooth transition to Canadian life.
The report recognized the work of the DMI for imple-
menting the special program that had provided for the 
initial reception, financial assistance, and counselling of 
refugees from Czechoslovakia between September 1968 and 
January 1969. In cooperation with provincial and municipal 
authorities, every possible means of assistance was given to 
newly arrived refugees. The formation of an intergovern-
mental and interdepartmental committee was instrumental 
in facilitating the exchange of information necessary for the 
aforementioned resettlement program. The report also listed 
several examples of the intergovernmental cooperation 
undertaken to facilitate the resettlement and integration of 
Prague Spring refugees in Ontario. In London, for example, 
the London International Services raised awareness of ref-
ugee issues among the local population. Using news outlets 
and personal networks, the voluntary service agency was 
able to assist recently resettled Prague Spring refugees in the 
area with housing, employment, clothing, and basic needs. 
In Cornwall, local agencies quickly recognized that the 20 
refugees resettled to the area had existing professions and 
trades, but lacked much-needed winter clothing and foot-
wear. Before they could begin their work placements, reset-
tlement support workers sought out the necessary apparel. 
A small number of Prague Spring refugees were resettled 
in summer cottages in Northern Ontario. In the region, 
women’s organizations were instrumental in securing cloth-
ing and basic necessities for the upcoming winter season. 
While the report applauded the work of the authorities and 
non-governmental organizations, it also pointed out that, in 
some cases, refugees were unsuccessful in adjusting to their 
new Canadian environment, while others continued to face 
difficulties in their new home (Colombo, 1969).
Given this reality, the DMI initiated its own study of the 
Prague Spring refugees’ integration in Canada. The study 
consisted of a sample of 2,734 out of 6,639 heads of house-
holds and spanned the initial three-year period after reset-
tlement in Canada. The results were based on the responses 
of 813 refugees (791 men and 22 unmarried women) to three 
questionnaires sent to them. Whether intentional or not, 
the study reaffirmed Cold War social norms by focusing on 
male heads of households. Immigration officials noted that 
the results were “reasonably representative,” even though 
respondents were largely male, middle-aged, technically 
skilled, and well-educated professionals. In addition, the 
respondents comprised less than 10% of the approximately 
11,200 refugees who were brought to Canada under the spe-
cial program (Ziegler, 1972). Unsurprisingly, the study found 
that the refugees were generally older and better educated, 
and consisted largely of professionals and craftspeople. 
Many were also married. Their employment conditions and 
level of income improved over the length of the study, and 
many reached the same level of employment as in Czech-
oslovakia. Most of the refugees were also able to maintain 
their employment and attained a higher level of income 
than the average immigrant in the same period. According 
to the surveys, the Prague Spring refugees worked 140 out 
of a possible 156 weeks. Over the three-year period, their 
monthly earnings increased from $518 to $726, and the 
average family income increased from $6,620 to $10,349 
annually, slightly more than immigrants who had arrived 
in Canada at the same time. Unlike these same immigrants, 
many of the refugees from Czechoslovakia struggled with 
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underemployment, especially professionals who sought 
work in their respective fields. These included doctors, 
dentists, engineers, and lawyers who had to undergo addi-
tional training, examinations, and re-certifications in order 
to practise in Canada. This was due in part to the refugees’ 
lack of acceptable qualifications and the state of the labour 
market at the time (Heatley, 1975, pp. 1–3).
In terms of social adaptation, approximately 85% of the 
refugees undertook courses—on life in Canada, for exam-
ple—whereas only 50% of immigrants did so. When it came 
to language training, 80% of the refugees were enrolled in 
English-language courses across the country, while 41% of 
refugees in Quebec chose French-language training at the 
time. As they learned either of Canada’s two official lan-
guages, only 29% of respondents indicated that they partic-
ipated in social groups and associations. Within this group, 
67% preferred organizations frequented by other Canadi-
ans. The study noted that a sizeable minority of the Prague 
Spring refugees began to identify more with Canada and 
slowly “relinquished” their cultural identity. By the third 
year of resettlement, 18% of refugee households spoke Eng-
lish rather than their mother tongue. In all, 67% of respond-
ents claimed a greater sense of belonging to Canada than 
to Czechoslovakia. When compared to other newcomers 
who arrived in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the refugees 
from Czechoslovakia felt far more Canadian than did their 
immigrant peers in their first three years in Canada (Heat-
ley, 1975, pp. 5–6).
Conclusion
During the special program for Prague Spring refugees to 
Canada, provincial and municipal agencies and services 
dealing with the resettlement of newcomers were more di-
verse than those that existed during the 1956 Hungarian ref-
ugee movement. Nevertheless, the successful resettlement 
and integration of the Prague Spring refugees depended 
on intergovernmental cooperation between Canada and its 
provinces, and the assistance provided by local Czech and 
Slovak communities across the country. In Ontario, refugee 
professionals from Czechoslovakia navigated language train-
ing, professional obstacles including securing accreditation 
of their foreign credentials, and underemployment in their 
respective fields. Their early experiences helped to shape 
bureaucratic and public views of refugee resettlement and 
integration.
The resettlement in Canada of approximately 37,500 Hun-
garians refugees, from 1956 to 1958, and 11,200 Czechs and 
Slovaks, from 1968 to 1969, demonstrated that federal refu-
gee policy needed to move away from ad hoc responses to 
sudden Cold War crises and towards formalized programs 
that offered admission and provided specific resettlement 
assistance according to the individual needs of refugees 
(Molloy & Madokoro, 2017). Less than five months after 
the termination of the special program for Prague Spring 
refugees, in June 1969, the Canadian government ratified 
the 1951 UN Convention Relating to Status of Refugees and 
its 1967 Protocol thereby recognizing asylum as an interna-
tional right.
During the 1970s, Canadian officials relied on institu-
tional learning gained from the two aforementioned special 
programs to better respond to successive refugee crises. 
While the resettlement of 228 Tibetan refugees in 1971 and 
1972 was coordinated with provincial officials before their 
arrival in Canada (Raska, 2016, p. 571), efforts to bring 
expelled Ugandan Asians—who did not meet the convention 
refugee definition—to Canada in 1972 required the use of an 
earlier federal Cabinet directive. The Oppressed Minority 
Policy, which permitted the resettlement of displaced indi-
viduals who had not fled their homeland, was used to admit 
more than 7,000 Ugandan Asians to Canada (Molloy, 2012).
As Canadian officials recognized that refugee resettle-
ment was becoming a necessity in Canadian immigration 
policy, Cold War ideology remained a major discriminatory 
factor in refugee admissibility, as evidenced by the Cana-
dian government’s initial reluctance to admit leftist Chilean 
refugees to Canada after the 1973 coup d’état (Dirks, 1977, p. 
258). In response to lobbying by refugee advocates, churches, 
and humanitarian organizations, nearly 7,000 individuals 
were brought to Canada under a special Chilean movement 
(Kelley & Trebilcock, 2010, pp. 367–368).
In the mid-1970s, the Canadian government formalized 
its immigration policy on refugees with the creation of 
the 1976 Immigration Act. Under this legislation, Canada 
solidified its obligations under the UN refugee convention 
by implementing a humanitarian class for convention ref-
ugees, and other persecuted and displaced peoples who did 
not qualify under the UN convention definition (Kelley & 
Trebilcock, 2010, pp. 388–389, 395). The new immigration 
legislation permitted private groups (of five or more indi-
viduals) and organizations to participate in refugee resettle-
ment by signing sponsorship agreements with the Canadian 
government. Under this groundbreaking initiative, between 
1979 and 1980, over 60,000 Vietnamese, Cambodian, and 
Laotian refugees were brought to Canada, of which 34,000 
were privately sponsored by some 7,000 groups (Canada, 
1982, pp.  5, 7–8, 13–14). The successful resettlement of this 
latter group of refugees, which remains the largest refugee 
movement to Canada, evolved from lessons learned from 
the earlier special programs for Hungarian and Prague 
Spring refugees.
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